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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
DONALD 0. HART and CINDY HART, 
Plaintiffs/Appellees, 
vs. 
GLEN SCHIMMELPFENNIG and 
KAREN SCHIMMELPFENNIG, 
Defendants/Appellants. 
Appellate Court No. 20080122 
REPLY BRIEF OF THE APPELLANTS 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Judge Hansen, in ruling on motions that were made during the course of the trial, 
stated that whether or not the plat referring to the proposed right of way created an express 
easement, was a legal issue, and whether there was an implied easement was a legal issue 
(Transcript Vol. 1, page 198 line 19 through page 199, line 3). It is the position of 
Schimmelpfennig that the determination of whether an express or implied easement exists, 
is a legal issue, and therefore, the judge's ruling is a conclusion of law. The standard of 
review for a conclusion of law is set forth on page 2 of Schimmelpfennig's Brief, under 
Standards of Review. 
The Utah Supreme Court, in the case of State v Levine, 144 P.3d 1096, 1102 (Utah 
2006), stated, 
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"The analytical complexity of our standard of review is at its height when 
we review a trial court's application of a legal concept to a given set of 
facts. When we review so-called "mixed questions of fact and law," the 
considerations that favor a more deferential standard of review and those 
that favor less-deferential standard of review compete for dominance, and 
the amount of deference that results will vary according to the nature of the 
legal concept at issue. Mixed questions of fact and law involving different 
legal issues will often require different standards of review. 
While we have said that, ultimately, "the legal effect of [the] facts is the 
province of the appellate courts," our prior decisions recognize that, with 
regard to many mixed questions of fact and law, it is either not possible or 
not wise for an appellate court to define strictly how a legal concept is to 
be applied to each new set of facts. Where the correct application of a legal 
concept is difficult to explain using a generally applicable standard, over-
involvement by an appellate court can lead to confusing and inconsistent 
pronouncements of the law. We have recognized that the application of 
such a legal concept incorporates a de facto grant of discretion to the trial 
court, and, accordingly, we review the trial court's decision on the mixed 
question of fact and law with deference commensurate to that discretion. 
But with regard to certain mixed questions where uniform application is of 
high importance, as in the context of Fourth Amendment protections, we have 
held that policy considerations dictate that the application of the legal concept 
should be strictly controlled by the appellate courts. Thus, if we determine that 
society's interest in establishing consistent statewide standards outweighs 
other considerations, we grant no discretion to the trial court, and we review 
the mixed question for correctness." 
Schimmelpfennig contends that the uniform application of law is of high importance 
in determining property rights, including the manner by which an easement may be 
established. If Judge Hansen's ruling were to stand, it would create a hybrid method of 
establishing an easement, that would not fit the strict definitions of an express easement or 
an implied easement, but would be more akin to an easement by prescriptive use that is for 
less than 20 years. It would also create confusion as to whether or not a parties' oral 
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agreement could create a right, which is more akin to a breach of contract. Hart contends that 
the standard of review is "clear error" or "clearly erroneous". While Schimmelpfennig 
opposes the application of this standard, he contends that the testimony at trial given by both 
parties and their witnesses does not support the court's findings of facts and conclusions of 
law, and is clearly erroneous. 
HART'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Schimmelpfennig believes that Hart has incorrectly cited to the record in his 
Statement of Facts. In f 17 of Hart's Statement of Facts, Hart refers to page 165 of the 
transcript to support the statement, "In building the access road with the fill, they used the 
existing trail path." Fox's testimony on page 165 of the transcript, was that the trail was 
covered up by some fill, however, on the following page, 166, of the transcript, Fox 
acknowledges that where the fill was placed was dictated by where the house pads had been 
located. When asked if where the fill was placed had anything to do with the path that had 
been there before, Fox stated, "Not really, not in my eyes." When asked, "So the path didn't 
dictate where it went?" Fox answered, "No" (Transcript Vol. l,page 166, lines 14-19). Hart 
alleges in f 19 of his Statement of Facts that Hart and Fox put in the permanent driveway in 
December of 1994. Hart cites the testimony of Fox on page 151 of the transcript for that 
proposition. On page 151, Fox stated that the permanent place of the road turned out to be 
where the pavement had been placed (Transcript Vol 1., page 151 lines 10-15). However, 
Fox, on page 153 of the transcript, testified that when fill was put down, he was not 
attempting to lay the final location of the road (Transcript Vol. 1, page 153, lines 23-24). 
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In f 38 of Hart's Statement of Facts, Hart states that the costs for re-contouring and 
re-landscaping would exceed $20,000. The trial record does not contain any testimony to 
this effect. Hart attempts to rely upon an affidavit which was filed in support of the Motion 
for Injunction (R. at 27). No such testimony was ever given before the court. Hart's 
contention that evidence in an affidavit can be used as evidence in a trial is incorrect. Hart 
cites the Rule 65A(a)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. This rule provides that an 
application for preliminary injunction can be consolidated with the trial of the action and the 
hearing on the application, and that "...any evidence received upon an application for 
permanent injunction which would be admissible at the trial on the merits, becomes part of 
the trial record, and need not be repeated at the trial...." Rule 801(c) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, defines hearsay as a statement, other than one made while testifying at the 
trial or hearing, offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Hart's Affidavit is clearly 
hearsay, and therefore, not admissible. Evidence of a party by an affidavit would not be 
admissible at trial, and therefore, cannot be relied upon to support the trial court's findings 




Hart argues in his brief that the parties agreed to a subsequent oral modification which 
was outside of the Statute of Frauds. Neither Hart's pleadings nor the testimony presented 
during the trial alleged that there was an oral modification of an agreement for an expressed 
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right of way. Hart specifically testified that the easement was defined by 
the subdivision plat, which Hart maintained allowed both the Harts and the 
Schimmelpfennigs access to 10 feet of the other parties' property, in the center of the 
proposed right of way (Transcript Vol. 2, page 80-81). Fox also testified that this was the 
intent of the parties (Transcript Vol. 1, page 149-150). The fact that the existing driveway 
is substantially on the Schimmelpfennig's property was a happenstance, created by the 
parties' rush to install some pavement so the homes could be built. Hart claims that the court 
made a finding that the Schimmelpfennigs purchased lot 2 with actual knowledge of the 
easement, and therefore, were bound by it, and that the Schimmelpfennigs did not appeal that 
finding (Hart's Brief, page 15). Hart's citing of the record is incorrect. Judge Hansen, in the 
first full paragraph on page four of his findings, made the statement, "...that Defendants 
purchased their home with actual knowledge of its condition (citation omitted). Defendants 
are hereby injoined from obstruction of the common driveway" (R. 241). The court did not 
find that because the Schimmelpfennigs had actual knowledge of the driveway, that they 
were bound by it. If that was the basis of Judge Hansen's ruling, then he would have to find 
that the right of way was created by prescription, and would have to be in place for 20 years 
or more, or by contract, neither of which was pled. Judge Hansen found that a right of way 
existed by express easement or by an implied easement. Hart incorrectly claims that 
Schimmelpfennig didn't appeal from all of Judge Hansen's ruling. The appeal states, "The 
Appellants appeal from the entirety of Judge Hansen's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 




The Harts claim that there was a writing that satisfied the Statute of Frauds. Judge 
Hansen found that the parties agreed to a 40 foot easement which was located between the 
parties' lots. The only evidence of a 40 foot easement was the proposed 40 foot wide utility 
easement and access road listed on the proposed subdivision plat, which was not signed by 
the parties, and was not recorded with Farmington City or Davis County. The Harts cite the 
case ofEvans v Board of County Com 'rs, 123 P.3d 432 (Utah 2005), for the proposition that 
there must be a writing subscribed by the parties to be charged. A subdivision plat does not 
satisfy this requirement. The Harts cite the case of Carrier v Lindquist, 2>1 P.3d 1112 (Utah 
2001), for the proposition that a private easement can be based upon a road on a plat map. 
However, the facts in Carrier are not similar with those of the present case. The court in 
Carrier found that the parties' properties were recorded on a plat map, but the plat map was 
recorded with the county. Additionally, both the Plaintiff and Defendant in Carrier had 
deeds which were recorded and which specifically referred to the recorded plat map. In 
Carrier, the plat map and the deeds of the parties qualified for a recording with the local 
government entity, and thereby, satisfied the Statute of Frauds. In the present case, the plat 
map upon which the Harts rely, was not subscribed by the parties, was not recorded, and no 
deeds make reference to it. 
The Harts rely upon Judge Hansen's findings that there was a meeting of the minds 
between the Foxes and the Harts, that the homes share a common driveway, and the driveway 
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be where the current driveway is. Schimmelpfennig acknowledges that the Harts and the 
Foxes agreed that there would be a common driveway located on the property line with 10 
feet on either side of their properties. The evidence did not establish that the parties agreed 
that the driveway would be in its current position. Schimmelpfennig cited the testimony of 
both Fox and Hart to this effect on pages 14-20 of Schimmelpfennig's Brief. The testimony 
given by both Fox and Hart was that the driveway was not agreed to be put substantially on 
the property of Fox's or Schimmelpfennig's property, but was to be equally located on both 
properties (Transcript Vol. 1, page 80, line 8 through page 81, line 6; page 84, lines 3-22; 
page 88, lines 3-21; pages 148-151; page 157, line 1 through page 159, line 6). 
The Harts, in their Complaint, allege in f^ 18, 19, 25, and 26 that the Harts own an 
express easement for a driveway across the north 20 feet of lot 2, and that the 
Schimmelpfennigs own an express easement for a driveway across the south 20 feet of lot 
1 (Hart's Complaint, Addendum to Reply Brief). The Harts did not amend their Complaint. 
Hart testified during the course of the trial that his position was that Schimmelpfennig had 
a right to access property on lot 1, pursuant to the parties' mutual agreement concerning a 
joint driveway. The court' s finding that the parties had a mutual agreement that the driveway 
was where it is currently located is contrary to the pleadings and testimony of Hart and Fox. 
Schimmelpfennig denied that the proposed subdivision plat, which was not signed by the 
parties, created an express easement. However, if it created an express easement, both Hart 
and Fox agreed that the driveway was to be 10 feet on both people's property, for a total of 
20 feet width. The court's statement that it would be unreasonable to assume that the road 
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would be 40 foot wide, did not comply with any of the evidence or testimony presented 
before the court. The trial court's ruling must conform to the claims of the parties and the 
evidence, if any, to support those claims. Therefore, if an expressed easement exists, then, 
as Hart admitted in his testimony, the easement lies 10 feet on Hart's property, and 10 feet 
on Schimmelpfennig's property. 
Hart's first cause of action is for an expressed easement, and the second cause of 
action is for an implied easement (Hart's Complaint, Addendum to Reply Brief). There was 
no other legal basis asserted in the pleadings, or during the course of the trial, related to the 
driveway. It is the position of the Schimmelpfennigs that the legal requirement for an 
expressed easement or an implied easement have not been established. These issues were 
argued in Schimmelpfennig's Brief, and will not be repeated in this Reply Brief. 
Hart, on page 26 of his Memorandum, claims that there is mutual consideration for 
the easement, and cites the case of Orton v Carter, 970 P.2d 533 (Utah App. 1999), for that 
proposition. In Orton, each party was permitted the use of 8 feet of the other parties' 
property. In this case, Hart has not allowed Fox or Schimmelpfennig the use of any 
substantial part of his property. In addition, Hart refused to participate in the cost of 
resurfacing the paved portion of the road on Schimmelpfennig's property (Transcript Vol. 
2, page 11). Hart encumbered the 10 feet of the right of way, which was intended to be on 
his property, by trees and a fence, thereby prohibiting Fox or Schimmelpfennig from having 
access to that 10 feet of the right of way. The evidence did not establish that any 
consideration was given by Hart for a mutual easement which is located substantially on all 
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of the property of Schimmelpfennig. Hart did not give any forbearance that could satisfy the 
requirement of consideration for an express easement. 
C. 
IMPLIED EASEMENT 
Hart's argument that the road fits the requirements of an implied easement rest upon 
the allegation that there was an existing road or trail that created a servitude on 
Schimmelpfennig's property, and that the trail (easement), was reasonably necessary for Hart 
to enjoy his estate. The evidence was clear that there was a trail or path that meandered from 
the city street to the back of the property for access to horses and a stream. The testimony 
was not clear as to where that was precisely located. The most compelling testimony 
concerning whether or not this trail had anything to do with the ultimate establishment of the 
driveway for the parties' property is the testimony of Hart. Hart testified that before either 
he or Fox owned the property, that he was permitted to keep horses on the property by the 
prior owner. When asked how he would get back to the horses, he testified, 
JUST DROVE DOWN THE MIDDLE OF THE PROPERTY, AND 
THERE'S KIND OF A TRAIL THAT WAS ALREADY THERE. WE 
JUST DROVE DOWN THAT TRAIL AND THAT'S KIND OF WHAT WE 
USED FOR THE ACCESS ROAD. 
IT PRETTY WELL FOLLOWS EXACTLY WHERE WE'RE - WHERE 
THE ROAD ENDED UP. I MEAN IT'S IRONIC (emphasis added), BUT 
THAT'S PRETTY WELL WHERE THE ROAD ENDED UP WAS RIGHT 
DOWN THE MIDDLE OF THE PROPOSED 40 FOOT EASEMENT THAT 
RATHMAN HAD PUT THERE. 
(Transcript Vol. 1, page 54, line 5 through page 55, line 10.) 
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Ironic is defined as "meaning the contrary of what is expressed; having the quality of 
irony; directly opposite to what is or might be expected; marked by coincidence or by 
curiosity or striking juxtaposition of events; unexpected; implausible; or ridiculous" 
(http://www.yourdictionary.com/ironic). The American Heritage Dictionary defines ironic 
as "The words ironic, irony, and ironically, are sometimes used of events and circumstances 
thatmight better be described as simply 'coincidental' or' impossible'...." American Heritage 
Dictionary of the English Language (4th ed., 2003). 
The subdivision plat, as well as the testimony of both Hart and Fox established that 
the homes were centrally located on lots 1 and 2, and that the proposed easement was located 
because of where the homes sat on the lots (Transcript Vol. 1, page 149, lines 7-25; page 166, 
line 3 through page 167, line 3). The intended location of the driveway down the center of 
the property lines, 10 feet on the side of each lot, had nothing to do with a path that 
meandered from the city road to the back of the property before the property was deeded to 
Hart and Fox. There is no evidence that the trail was relied upon 
by the engineer that prepared the subdivision plat, or by the parties in setting the location of 
their homes. 
The trail did not impose a burden on the Fox's or Schimmelpfennig's property. 
Servitude is defined as, "a charge or burden resting upon one estate for the benefit or 
advantage of another." Black's Law Dictionary, (5th ed., 1979). No testimony was 
presented before the court that when lot 1 and 2 were deeded to Hart and Fox, that Hart relied 
upon a servitude that had been existing on Fox's property, or that a servitude had anything 
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to do with the creation of the proposed easement for a right of way. The court's attention is 
directed to Hart's Complaint, which alleges that the right of way, which Hart seeks to 
enforce, is created by the proposed 40 foot right of way, which is located down the center of 
the parties' property. Hart's Complaint relies upon the 40 foot right of way in support of his 
claim for an expressed easement, as set forth in f 18 and 19 of his Complaint, and in support 
of his implied easement, as set forth in f 25 and 26 of Hart's Complaint (Hart's Complaint, 
Addendum to Reply Brief). The Complaint makes no reference to an existing trail. That 
issue was raised by Hart during the course of the trial because he realized the weakness of 
his allegation that he had an implied easement. 
The trial court's finding that the trail had anything to do with the implied easement 
was without any foundation in fact or in law. 
D. 
MARSHALING EVIDENCE 
Hart claims that Schimmelpfennig did not marshal the evidence in favor of Hart's 
position. Hart asserts that he has an easement based upon the following: 
1. A mutual agreement of the parties (Transcript Vol. 1, p. 51 -52, 111 -122); 
2. The existence of a paved road (Transcript Vol. 2, p. 151); 
3. The existence of a trail (Transcript, Vol. 1, p. 137-138); 
4. The existence of the proposed subdivision plat showing the proposed road 
(Def s Ex. 9 and 9b). 
Schimmelpfennig, in his brief, addressed each of these issues, and attempted to 
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indicate why those issues did not support a finding of expressed or implied easement. The 
testimony of Hart, Fox, and Schimmelpfennig were cited extensively. Schimmelpfennig 
believes that he clearly indicated to this court the basis of Hart's claim, and then addressed 
why those claims were not established at the time of trial. 
CONCLUSION 
Hart's Complaint asserted that Hart had an easement on the theory of express 
easement or implied easement. Hart claimed that the easement consisted of a right of way 
located 20 feet on Hart's side of the property, and 20 feet on Schimmelpfennig's side of the 
property. No other legal theories were alleged in Hart's Complaint. Hart did not claim in 
his pleadings or during the course of trial that there was an oral modification of the expressed 
right of way, that he had a prescriptive right over the driveway, or that he 
had a contractual right to use the driveway. 
Hart cites the court' s statement that Schimmelpfennig purchased the home with actual 
knowledge of the existence of the driveway. That finding would have no bearing on the 
doctrine of express or implied easement, and if it was intended to relate to a prescriptive 
easement or a right created by a contract, it was not supported by the pleadings or evidence 
received by the court during the course of the trial. 
There was no express easement created because there was no writing signed by the 
parties, and there was no consideration between the parties. The requirements of the Statute 
of Frauds was not satisfied by part performance because Hart did not give any forbearance 
or consideration for the use of the driveway located on Schimmelpfennig's property. In 
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addition, Hart and Fox did not reach a mutual agreement that the driveway could be located 
solely on Fox's or Schimmelpfennig's property. If this court finds that the parties did have 
a mutual agreement and the requirements for an express easement have been established, then 
the express easement must conform with the relief requested in Hart's Complaint, and the 
subdivision plat setting forth the easement. Only 20 feet of the proposed right of way was 
for a driveway. Hart and Fox testified that the driveway was to be placed between the 
parties' properties, with 10 feet on each parties' property. There was no evidence presented 
before the court that supported the conclusion that the parties had agreed that the driveway 
would be solely on Schimmelpfennig's property. 
The evidence did not support an implied easement. Both Hart and Fox testified 
that the path or trail that meandered through the property before the property was divided 
and that lot 1 for Hart and lot 2 for Fox did not determine the location of the proposed right 
of way. That location was determined by where the homes had been placed on the property 
and the subdivision plat that had been prepared by the engineer. The proposed 40 foot right 
of way and easement is divided so that 20 feet falls on both lot 1 and 2. In addition, there 
was no servitude as a result of the trail upon Fox's property. Hart's use of the driveway on 
Schimmelpfennig's property is not necessary. He has clear access to his property on lot 1, 
without having to access lot 2. Consequently, at least three of the required elements for 
implied easement do not exist, and were not supported by any testimony or evidence during 
the course of the trial 
Schimmelpfennig requests that the court's ruling be reversed in accordance with the 
13 
relief that was set forth in Schimmelpfennig's Appellate Brief. 
DATED this^A Fday of September, 2008. 
^ ' ^ c z ^ 
tOBERT A. ECHARD 
T.R. MORGAN 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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Appellate Court No. 20080122 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Robert A. Echard, certify that on September 24,2008,1 served two copies of the Reply 
Brief of the Appellants upon John D. Morris, counsel for Plaintiff/Appellees, Donald O. Hart and 
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Telephone: (801) 292-6400 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
DAVIS COUNTY, FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT 
DONALD O. MART and CINDY HART, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs., 




Case No. 06090 -PR 
Honorable 
District Judge 
Plaintiffs, by and through their attorneys, allege as follows: 
PARTIES, JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
1. Plaintiffs and Defendants are Davis County residents. 
2. The adjacent parcels of real property referred to hereafter are situated in Davis County. 
3. Jurisdiction and Venue of this matter are properly in this Court. 
GENERAL FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 
4. Plaintiffs and Tom and Lori Fox (the "Foxes") jointly subdivided and developed two lots 
between March andDecember 1994: Plaintiffs' Lot 1 (367 So. 1100 W., Farmington) ("Lot 1") and the 
Foxes' Lot 2 (387 So. 1100 W., Farmington) ("Lot 2"). 
5. Plaintiffs and the Foxes jointly agreed that a 40' utility and access road easement run East 
along the boundary between Lot 1 and Lot 2 from the cut in the road at 1100 West Street back past the 
then proposed location of the two houses back to a point just West of where the boundary line takes 
a 90° jog to the right, heading South for about 40' (the "40' Jog"), jointly submitting a written 
application for subdivision to Fartnington City along with an engineer's plat map, a true and correct 
copy of which is attached as Exhibit "A" (the "Plat Map") 
6. Plaintiffs and the Foxes also jointly agreed that the telephone lines to both Lot 1 and Lot 2 
should tap into the City's main line along 1100 West Street at the Northwest corner of Lot 1, whence 
it would travel at a 30° angle (more or less) to 1100 West Street across Lot 1 and the 40' utility and 
access road easement, at which point the Foxes' line would follow the South edge of the 40' utility and 
access road easement to the Foxes' proposed house on Lot 2. Plaintiffs and the Foxes also jointly 
agreed that a joint sewer line should tap into the City's main line at the cut in 1100 West Street and 
run from the cut within the 40' road and utilities easement but on the Lot 1 side of the boundary. 
7. Plaintiffs and the Foxes also jointly agreed that the secondary water line to both Lot 1 and 
Lot 2 should tap into the City's main line along 1100 West Street at the Southwest corner of Lot 2, 
whence it would travel at a 45° angle (more or less) to 1100 West Street across Lot 2 and the 40' utility 
and access road easement to the North boundary of Lot 1, where it services the owner of the realty 
immediately North of Lot 1. Plaintiffs and the Foxes also jointly agreed that a joint water line should 
tap into the City's main line at the cut in 1100 West Street and run from the cut within the 40' road and 
utilities easement but on the Lot 2 side of the boundary. 
8. Plaintiffs and the Foxes jointly in mid May 1994 ordered and paid for an approximately 12' 
wide paved driveway (the "Driveway") that runs East along the boundary between Lot 1 and Lot 2 from 
the cut in the road at 1100 West Street back past the then proposed location of the two houses back to 
a point just West of the 40' Jog. At some points along its length the Driveway is contained about 10* 
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on the Lot 2 side of the boundary and at some points about 6-8', The actual location of the Driveway 
was chosen jointly by Plaintiffs and the Foxes for aesthetic and other reasons 
9. Plaintiffs and the Foxes jointly after May but before December 1994 ordered and paid for 
the installation of the telephone line and the secondary water line as described in *|fl[ 6-7, above, and on 
attached Exhibit "A" 
10. Plaintiffs and the Foxes jointly maintained the Driveway and enjoyed the joint telephone 
line and secondary water line until the Foxes sold Lot 2 to Defendants in about March 1999. 
11. Plaintiffs and Defendants jointly maintained the Driveway and enjoyed the joint telephone 
line and secondary water line until 2005, during the latter months of which Defendants demanded 
Plaintiffs no longer use the Driveway. See, e,g>, attached Exhibit "B", a true and correct copy of 
Defendants' counsel's 11 November 2005 letter. 
12. Plaintiffs have installed significant improvements along their side of the Driveway, 
including fencing, berms, trees and other landscaping as shown on attached Exhibit "CM, a true and 
correct photograph of those improvements. 
13. Defendants have also threatened to cut off the secondary water service to Lot 1 and 
Plaintiffs' neighbor on the East 
14. Plaintiffs have looked into installing their own driveway, and the cost, including re-
contouring and relandscaping the land adjacent to the boundary between Lot 1 and Lot 2, but wholly 
on the Lot 1 side of the boundary, would exceed $20,000. 
15. Over the weekend on 20-21 May 2006, Plaintiffs observed Defendants digging a 2-J deep 
treftch along the boundary between Lot 1 and Lot 2 behind the parties' homes just West of the 40* jog, 
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across part of which Plaintiffs have constructed a fence and access gate (which straddles the boundary) 
which is their sole access from the Driveway to the rear of their property. They later discovered that 
Defendants have parked an unused horse trailer across the Driveway in front of the trench, effectively 
blocking all access to the gate. Attached as Exhibits "D" and "E" are true and correct photographs of 
Plaintiffs' gate and fence at the point of the trench both before and after the time Defendants dug the 
beginning of the trench. The location of the fence and gate are depicted in attached Exhibit "A*'. 
16. Defendants have also expressed their intentions to extend the trench all the way to the cut 
In the road at 1100 West Street, in which they intend to build a wall or fence, which would prevent 
Plaintiffs' access along the Driveway to their home. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Declaratory Judgment: Express Easement) 
17. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference all prior and subsequent allegations. 
18. Plaintiffs own an express easement for driveway and utility purposes across the North 20' 
of Lot 2, which Defendants knew of and took subject to when they purchased Lot 2. 
19. Defendants own an express easement for driveway and utility purposes across the South 
20'of Lot 1. 
20. Plaintiffs own an express easement across a part of Lot 2 for culinary and secondary water, 
which Defendants knew of and took subject to when they purchased Lot 2. 
21. Defendants own an express easement across a part of Lot i for telephone and sewer. 
22. The express easements set forth above all run with the land. 
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23. Plaintiffs are entitled to a judgment declaring that Lot 1 and Lot 2 are both charged with 
the utility and driveway easements set forth herein, for attorney's fees and costs to the extent and as 
allowed by law, and for such other and further relief as the Court deems just and equitable. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Declaratory Judgment: Implied Easement) 
24. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference all prior and subsequent allegations. 
25. Plaintiffs own an implied easement for driveway and utility purposes across the North 20' 
of Lot 2, which Defendants knew of and took subject to when they purchased Lot 2, 
26. Defendants own an implied easement for driveway and utility purposes across the South 
20* of Lot 1. 
27. Plaintiffs own an implied easement across a part of Lot 2 for culinary and secondary water, 
which Defendants knew of and took subject to when they purchased Lot 2, 
28. Defendants own an implied easement across a part of Lot 1 for telephone and sewer. 
29. The implied easements set forth above all run with the land. 
30. Plaintiffs are entitled to a judgment declaring that Lot 1 and Lot 2 are both charged with 
the utility and driveway easements set forth herein, for attorney's fees and costs to the extent and as 
allowed by law, and for such other and further relief as the Court deems just and equitable. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Injunctive Relief) 
31. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference all prior and subsequent allegations. 
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32. Plaintiffs are entitled to preliminary and permanent injunctive relief removing both present 
and future encroachments and trespasses by Defendants, their heirs and assigns, upon and against 
Plaintiffs' express and/or implied easements for driveway and utilities across Lot 2, for attorney's fees 
to the extent and as allowed by law, and for such other and further relief as the Court deems just and 
equitable. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for judgment as follows: 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
For a judgment declaring that Lot 1 and Lot 2 are both charged with the utility and driveway 
easements set forth above, for attorney's fees and costs to the extent and as allowed by law, and for 
such other and further relief as the Court deems just and equitable, 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
For a judgment declaring that Lot 1 and Lot 2 are both charged with the utility and driveway 
easements set forth above, for attorney's fees and costs to the extent and as allowed by law, and for 
such other and further relief as the Court deems just and equitable. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
For preliminary and permanent injunctive relief removing both present and future 
encroachments and trespasses by Defendants, their heirs and assigns, upon and against Plaintiffs' 
express and/or implied easements for driveway and utilities across Lot 2, for attorney's fees to the 
extent and as allowed by law, and for such other and further relief as the Court deems just and 
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equitable. 
DATED 23 May 2006. 
Plaintifts's Address: 
Defendants's Address: 
Ronald L.Dunn, Esq. 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
387 So. 1100 W.,Farmington,UT 84025 
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